

Third World Hunger Study Part II

(Non-Emergency, Chronic Food Deficit Problems)

Chairman: Ambassador Robert B. Keating

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Third World Hunger Study, Part II

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Actual Allocation Criteria for Inter-Agency Decision Making Process

USDA

- Develops markets for US commercial exports of food.
- Disposes of surplus agricultural produce.

State

- Avoids trade frictions.
- Protects strategic balance and political objectives worldwide.

Treasury

- Maintains stability of international financial system.

OMB


- Limits USG spending.

AID

- Promotes effective economic development using local currency proceeds.
- Responds to real food shortfalls.

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Actual Decision-Making Process for PL 480 Title I Programs




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Areas of Inter-Agency Conflict

- Diagram three key agencies and six recurring areas of substantive conflict.
- Red line indicates inter-agency areas of conflict.
- Yellow line highlights crucially important role of third agency in reconciling conflicts between other two agencies.
- OMB and Treasury can exercise veto power, but are not generally involved in formulating specific aspects of PL 480 programs.

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Areas of Inter-Agency Conflict



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Actual Allocation Criteria for Inter-Agency Decision-Making Process

USDA – Promote U.S. Agricultural Exports and Support Domestic Farm Income

STATE – Support Allies and Avoid Trade Friction

AID – Promote Economic Development in Recipient Countries

TREASURY – Protect Stability of International Financial System and Evaluate Credit
Worthiness of Sovereign Borrowers

OMB – Limit Size of Budget and Restrict Ongoing Programs

1 Dispose of Surplus Commodities	2 Protect Commerical Food Exports	3 Increase Future Food Exports
4 Strategic Importance of Recipient Country	5 Willingness to Undertake Market-Oriented Policies	6 Balance of Payments Support
7 No Disincentive to Local Agriculture	8 Willingness to Accept UMRs	9 Humanitarian Need to Cover Food Shortfall
10 Willingness to Repay Previous PL 480 Loans	11 Willingness to Undertake Economic Adjustment Measures	12 Potential for Absorbing More and More PL 480 Overtime

Multi-Attribute Utility Theory for Inter-Agency Food Aid Decision-Making

Purposes:

- 1.) Assessing the achievement of the overall objectives of PL 480 legislation: market development, foreign policy support, economic development, and minimum cost to USG.**
- 2.) Evaluating the allocation criteria actually used in the inter-agency decision-making process (the attached matrix assigns a number from -10 to +10 as a means of measuring each criterion's importance in achieving a specific food aid objective.)**
- 3.) Ranking allocation criteria as a function of relative weighting of food aid objectives.**


Inter-Agency Food Aid Decision Making

PL480 Objectives

Actual Allocation Criteria	I Market Development		II Minimum Cost to U.S.G		III Foreign Policy Leverage		IV Economic Development		Outcome (Depends on Relative Weights)				
	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank	%	Even	I=70%	II=70%	III=70%	IV=70%
1 Willingness to Accept Abundant Commodities -USDA	9	33	7	23	0	0	0	0	56 H	25.4	19.4	5.6	5.6
2 Non-Displacement of U.S. Food Export -USDA	10	37	1	3	0	0	0	0	40	26.2	5.8	4.0	4.0
3 Potential Commercial Market -USDA	10	37	2	6	0	0	0	0	43	26.5 H	7.9	3.7	4.3
4 Strategic Importance -STATE	0	0	0	0	10	20	0	0	20	2	2	14	2
5 Pro-Private Sector Economic Policies -AID	5	18	0	0	5	10	10	22	50	15.8	5	11	18.2 H
6 Balance of Payments Support -STATE	0	0	0	0	9	18	8	17	35	3.5	3.5	14.3	13.7
7 No Disincentive to Local Agriculture -AID	-8	-29	0	0	6	12	10	22	5	-16.9 L	.5 L	7.7	13.7
8 Willingness to Accept U.M.R.S. -STATE	5	18	0	0	10	20	0	0	38	14.6	3.8	15.8 H	3.8
9 Unanticipated Food Shortfall -AID	0	0	0	0	5	10	6	13	23	2.3	2.3	8.3	10.1
10 Willingness to Repay PL480 Loans -TREASURY	3	11	9	30	0	0	3	6	47	11.3	22.7 H	4.7	8.3
11 Economic Adjustment Measures -TREASURY	3	11	1	3	3	6	8	17	37	10.3	5.5	7.3	13.9
12 Low Potential to Absorb Additional Resources -OMB	-10	-37	10	33	0	0	0	0	-4 L	-15.9	19.4	-4	-4

US Food Export Policy Dilemma

Many Third World countries with potential growth prospects are unable to pay cash for US food.



Key Question: Would not changes in our agricultural export credit programs help expand the economies of key Third World countries and bring a return to the US economy?

Key Considerations:

- 1.) The pros and cons of providing intermediate credit (say 7-10 years) to help key Third World countries with their food needs during a period of debt crisis.
- 2.) The pros and cons of new legislation permitting a GSM intermediate guarantee program.
- 3.) The pros and cons of providing funding for the currently authorized direct intermediate GSM 301 credit program (or should it be scrapped?).
- 4.) The pros and cons of providing easier terms for PL 480 Titles I and III (including local currency repayment, less complicated regulations and requirements).

Key Question: Would not changes in our agricultural export credit programs help expand the economies of key Third World countries and bring a return to the US economy?

Key Considerations: (Continued)

- 5.) The pros and cons of turning Title I into a multi-year program and scrapping Title III.
- 6.) The pros and cons of providing a higher level of overall PL 480 food aid.
- 7.) The pros and cons of the present level of Title II non-emergency regular programming (1.2 million mt/yr -- too high, too low, just right?).
- 8.) What is the appropriate mix of present and proposed programs in our "food for progress" strategy?

The Changing Economic Circumstances of Third World Countries

Geo-Political Context (National Security Implications)

- Socialist economic model failing to generate growth for Third World countries.
- Third World countries beginning to experiment with more market-oriented approaches.
- US should target assistance to underwrite economic reform efforts during transition period austerity.
- Soviets unable to offer much in the way of economic assistance.
- Demonstrated success of economic reform measures can shift US-Soviet balance of influence in the Third World.

**“Food for Progress” to back up agricultural policy reform
in key Third World countries**

Goal: To use American food resources more effectively in support of Third World countries which have made commitments to policy changes in four critical areas:

- Agricultural price policy
- Marketing reform and liberalization
- Input supply and distribution policy
- Private sector involvement

**“Food for Progress” to back up agricultural policy reform
in key Third World countries**

- The sole objective of the “Food for Progress” initiative would be to support the IMPLEMENTATION of policy changes over a medium-term transition period in Third World countries of strategic value and trade potential, initially in Sub-Saharan Africa.
- Unlike present food aid programs with comprehensive and multiple objectives, this initiative would:
 - Connect food aid with strategies to achieve structural reforms in food pricing and marketing;
 - Involve co-financing with the World Bank and other financing institutions;
 - Make use of government-owned food stocks (accounting model -- President Reagan’s Section 416 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act).

Reasons for "Food for Progress" Initiative

- In Sub-Saharan Africa, food import needs are increasing by at least 700,000 mt per year.
- Use of 500,000 mt/yr of USG-owned food surpluses (17.5 million mt) would increase non-emergency US food aid by 50 percent to 1.5 million mt/yr.
- Today's emergency food crises highlight the need to tackle the underlying structural problems of agricultural stagnation.
- US food abundance can reduce the political risks to leaders of key Third World countries undertaking agricultural reform measures during a transition period of economic hardship.
- The intention of this initiative is to provide incentives for improved food production policies.

Size and Cost of "Food for Progress" Initiative

Duration: 4 years.

Size: 500,000 mt/year of wheat, corn and rice in addition to regular PL 480 commodities.

Value: \$90 million/year (sunk investment -- already paid for by CCC).

Accounting: The use of surplus commodities owned by the Commodity Credit Authority (CCC) through the authority of Section 416. Since the new initiative would use food resources already paid for by the USG, the net cost would be transport (est. \$40 million), minus savings in storage (est. \$6 million).

Recipient

Countries: Initially, 6-8 Sub-Saharan African countries.

“Food for Progress” to Back-Up Agricultural Policy Reform

- 1.) Price policy reform to provide incentives to farmers to produce food on a regular basis for the market.
 - Adequate price levels for agricultural commodities.
 - Timely payment to farmers for their commodities.
- 2.) Other policy reform to help create an efficient internal market for increased agricultural productivity.
 - Greater farmer access to private, competitive markets.
 - Market-determined exchange rate.
 - Adequate foreign exchange for imported inputs along with their efficient and timely delivery (fertilizer, pesticide, credit).
 - Adequate rural infrastructure (farm-to-market roads, collection stations, storage).


USG-Owned Grain Stocks

(Source: USDA)

Total:	17.5 MILLION MT (\$2.6 Billion)
Wheat	8.8 Million MT (Including the International Emergency Food Reserve of 4.0 Million MT)
Corn	5.1 million MT
Rice	0.9 million MT
Sorghum	2.3 million MT
Other Grains	.4 million MT

Sub-Sahara African Food Import Needs

- A) USDA projects a food shortfall of at least 3.7 million MT in FY 1985
- B) PL 480 Titles I & II will provide 1.2 million in FY 1985
- C) The "Food for Progress" initiative would provide an additional 500,000 MT/YR for four years




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Sub-Saharan Africa Long-Term Decline in Per Capita Grain Production and Consumption

For the Last Two Decades,
Sub-Saharan Countries have Faced:

- Declining Per Capita Production (20%)
- Declining Per Capita Consumption (7%)
- Increasing Reliance on International Food Aid Programs
- Falling Export Earnings
- High Population Growth



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"Food for Progress"
Decision Analysis for Selection of
Recipient Countries (Illustrative)

Potential Recipients	Strategic (FY86 ESF)			Co-Financing Impact (Existing W.B. Agr. Programs)			Food Aid Needs (USDA Projection)			Trade Potential (Population)			Country Ranking	
	Weights .40			.20			.20			.20				
	Index	%	MAUT Value	Index	%	MAUT Value	Index	%	MAUT Value	Index	%	MAUT Value	MAUT Value Total	
Angola	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0.6	7	7	1.4	2.0	Resource Response Index (Proposed)
Benin	0	0	0	3	5	1.0	3	3	0.6	2	2	0.4	2.0	
Burkina-Fasso	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0.6	5	5	1.0	3.6	
Chad	4	6	2.4	0	0	0	2	2	0.4	2	4	0.8	3.6	
Ethiopia	0	0	0	8	13	2.6	10	9	1.8	10	10	2.0	6.4	
Ghana	0	0	0	7	11	2.2	8	7	1.4	7	7	1.4	5.0	
Kenya	8	12	4.8	0	0	0	8	7	1.4	8	8	1.6	7.8	
Lesotho	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	4	0.8	0	0	0	0.8	
Liberia	8	12	4.8	4	6	1.2	1	1	0.2	1	1	0.2	6.4	
Madagascar	3	5	2.0	6	10	2.0	8	7	1.4	6	6	1.2	6.6	
Mali	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	4	1.0	5	5	1.0	2.0	
Mauritania	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	4	1.0	0	0	0	1.0	
Mozambique	5	8	3.2	0	0	0	8	7	1.4	7	7	1.4	6.0	
Niger	4	6	2.4	0	0	0	5	4	1.0	3	3	0.6	4.0	
Senegal	5	8	3.2	5	8	1.6	8	7	1.4	5	5	1.0	7.2	
Sierra Leone	0	0	0	7	11	2.2	2	2	0.4	1	1	0.2	2.8	
Somalia	7	11	4.4	5	8	1.6	8	7	1.4	2	2	0.4	7.8	
Sudan	10	15	6.0	10	16	3.2	8	7	1.4	8	8	1.6	12.2	
Tanzania	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	8	1.6	8	8	1.6	3.2	
Zaire	5	8	3.2	0	0	0	4	3	0.6	10	10	2.0	5.8	
Zambia	6	9	3.6	7	11	2.2	2	2	0.4	5	5	1.0	7.2	

The Leveraging of Agricultural Policy Reform Through "FOOD FOR PROGRESS"

The amount of "leverage" will be influenced by:

- 1.) The ratio of:
$$\frac{\text{"Food for Progress" additional food assurance}}{\text{A country's total food needs}}$$
- 2.) The potential recipient country's performance in implementing agreed-upon policy reforms (World Bank/IMF conditionality).
- 3.) The potential recipient country's agreement to:
 - More fully implement needed policy measures if provided with multi-year additional food assurance, or
 - To change a disfunctional economic policy.

The analytical task is to:

- 1.) Back-up or select those policies within a country which would yield the largest economic return for the additional food assurance of the "Food for Progress" program, and
- 2.) Then determine which countries would yield the largest potential economic return through participation in the "Food for Progress" program.

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Consumption




Production



PL 480
Title I



Selection of "Food for Progress" Policy Targets




Policies for Leverage

- Farmer Prices
- Exchange Rates
- Food Subsidy Levels to Consumers
- Involvement of Private Enterprise in Marketing System
- Fertilizer Import Regulations

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Recipient Country Production and Consumption of Staple Food Items

Implementation of "Food for Progress" Over Time



USG Bi-Lateral Assistance Programs

PL 480 Title I: Food aid sold on highly concessional terms on a one-year basis to support foreign policy, economic development, and market development objectives.

PL 480 Title II: Food aid given away on a one-year basis to the neediest people in a country regardless of their government's policies.

PL 480 Title III: Multi-year food aid in support of multi-sectoral economic development objectives.

GSM 102 & GSM 5: CCC guarantees and loans to develop markets for US agricultural commodities (repayment on a three-year basis).

USG Bi-Lateral Assistance Programs (Continued)

Economic Support Fund: Grants for multi-purpose budget and balance of payments support commensurate with foreign policy objectives (one-year allocation).

Development Assistance: Grants and concessional loans in support of multi-sectoral economic development projects (one-year basis allocation).

Economic Policy Initiative: Cash grants in support of multi-sectoral economic reform in Africa (one-year allocation).

"Food for Progress": The use of USG-owned food on a multi-year basis in support of agricultural policy reform in key Third World countries.

S-Strong
M-Moderate
P-Partial
N-Negligible

USG Bi-Lateral Assistance Programs

Programs	Program Structure			Program Objectives					Program Results	
	Value (Millions)	Terms	Duration	Market Development	Foreign Policy	Humanitarian Assistance to Neediest	Multi-Sector Economic Development	Reform Agricultural Pricing	Domestic Political Support	Effectiveness in Meeting Program Objectives
PL 480 Title I	\$730.0	Concessional Credit (15-40 yrs)	1 Year	S	M	P	M	P	S	S
PL 480 Title II (Section 206)	\$800.0 \$20.0	Grant Grant	1 Year 3 Years	N N	N N	S M	N M	N P	S P	M P
PL 480 Title III	\$106.0	Conditional Grant	3 Years	N	P	P	S	M	P	N
GSM-102	\$5,000.0	Commercial Interest (3 yrs)	1 Year	S	N	N	N	N	S	S
GSM-5	\$120.0	No interest (3 yrs)	1 Year	S	N	N	N	N	M	P
GSM-301	0		1 Year	S	N	N	N	N	P	N
Economic Support Fund	\$3,438.1	Grant	1 Year	N	S	N	N	N	P	S
Economic Policy Initiative	\$75.0	Grant	1 Year	N	M	N	S	M	P	Not Yet Attempted
Development Assistance	\$2,266.1	Concessional Credit and Grant	1 Year	N	M	P	S	P	P	M
Food for Progress	\$90.0	Conditional Grant	4 Years	M	M	N	P	S	S	Not Yet Attempted

An Integrated Food Aid Program for Sub-Saharan Africa

- “Food for Progress” and the Economic Policy Initiative (EPI) both provide additional resources for Sub-Saharan African countries. “Food for Progress” should not displace PL 480 Titles I, II, III, or other donors’ food aid.
- Decision analysis (MAUT) can help determine the proper mix of “Food for Progress”, EPI, PL 480, and other food aid instrumentalities for a recipient country.

**An Integrated Food-Aid Program
for Sub-Saharan Africa (Illustrative)**

Recipient Countries (by FY 85 ESF)	Other Donors 30 %			Title I 20%			Title II 5%			Food Self-Sufficiency 45%			Country Ranking	Appropriate Program
	Index	%	MAUT	Index	%	MAUT	Index	%	MAUT	Index	%	MAUT		
Sudan	10	17	5.1	10	23	4.6	5	13	0.7	5	10	4.5	14.9	E.P.I.
Kenya	7	12	3.6	5	12	2.4	8	21	1.1	2	4	1.8	8.9	Food for Progress
Liberia	2	3	0.9	6	14	2.8	0	0	0	5	10	4.5	8.2	Food for Progress
Somalia	10	17	5.1	7	16	3.2	0	0	0	6	12	5.4	13.7	E.P.I.
Zambia	6	10	3.0	5	12	2.4	0	0	0	4	8	3.6	9.0	E.P.I.
Zaire	2	3	0.9	6	14	2.8	5	13	0.7	1	2	0.9	5.3	Food for Progress
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	20	9.0	9.0	E.P.I.
Sengal	10	17	5.1	4	9	1.8	10	26	1.3	6	12	5.4	13.6	E.P.I.
Chad	5	9	2.7	0	0	0	5	13	0.7	3	6	2.7	6.1	Food for Progress
Botswana	3	5	1.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	18	8.1	9.6	E.P.I.
Niger	1	2	0.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	8	3.0	4.2	Food for Progress
Djibouti	2	3	0.9	0	0	0	5	13	0.7	1	2	0.9	2.5	Food for Progress
Total Sub-Saharan African	58			43			38			50				

Why Should We Use USG-Owned Food Stocks?

- Provides needed additional food resources without raising appropriations.
- Reduces large USG-owned food stocks overhanging depressed agricultural markets.
- Will not disrupt food aid levels of other PL 480 programs.
- Permits greater year-to-year scheduling flexibility without the pressures of annual appropriations and commodity interests, thereby increasing the "Food for Progress" program's effectiveness for recipient countries and US leverage for policy reform in the agricultural sector.
- For the same reasons, the use of USG-owned food stocks for the "Food for Progress" initiative would lend itself to co-financing arrangements with the World Bank and other financing institutions.

Why would reprogramming of existing PL 480 instrumentalities fail to accomplish the "Food for Progress" objective -- agricultural policy reform?

- Planned PL 480 resources only cover essential State/Aid/USDA requirements to meet A.) Title I/III multiple objectives, B.) Title II non-emergency statutory minimum food aid, and C.) the Title II reserve for emergencies.
- Reprogramming PL 480 instrumentalities for "Food for Progress" would subject the new initiative to unpredictability of funds and pressures from State/Aid/USDA to add their multiple goals to the new initiative's single objective of agricultural policy reform, and thus seriously undermine its single objective.
- Reprogramming PL 480 instrumentalities for "Food for Progress" would appear unimaginative and unimportant to the Hill.
- Reprogramming PL 480 instrumentalities for "Food for Progress" would make it unattractive as a legislative proposal because of the resulting loss of many of the unique characteristics of the new Presidential initiative, plus the lack of clearly identified funding.

**Program Characteristics Needed to Promote
Agricultural Policy Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa**

Programs	VALUE (Millions)	TERMS	Economic Reform Conditionality	Multi-year Commitment	Uses USG Owned Food	Free from Annual "Use or Lose" Ap- propriation	Free from Domestic Commodity Interest Pressure	Free from Competing Agency Interests, ("BARNACLES")	Discretionary Control Over Delivery (Lends Itself to Co-Financing)	U.S. Domestic Political Support
PL 480 Title I	\$730.0	Concessional Credit	P	N	N	N	N	N	N	P
PL 480 Title II	\$800.0	Grant	N	N	N	N	N	P	N	S
PL 480 Title III	\$106.0	Conditional Grant	P	S	N	N	N	N	N	N
E.P.I. (E.S.F.)	\$75.0	Grant	S	P	N	N	S	P	P	N
Section 416	Sunk Investment (U.S.G.-Owned Commodities)	Grant	N	N	S	S	S	S	N	P
"Food for Progress" (Section 416 Expanded to Target Reform in Agriculture)	Sunk Investment U.S.G.-Owned Commodities Valued at \$90.0 million per year	Conditional Grant	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S

S-Strong

P-Partial

N-Negligible

Why would the "Food for Progress" initiative, based on the use of surplus commodities owned by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC - Section 416), succeed better than existing food aid programs in achieving agricultural policy reform?

- The "Food for Progress" initiative would be the only US food aid instrument employing additional food resources specifically for the purpose of leveraging price and policy reform in key Third World countries. The major distinguishing characteristics of the new initiative may be summarized as follows:
 - It would make clear President Reagan's intent to match temporary USG-owned food stocks with the food needs of key Third World countries during their transition periods to more market-oriented agricultural systems (not a 30-year food aid program).
 - It would use food resources already paid for by the USG where the net additional cost would be transport, minus savings in storage.

Why would the "Food for Progress" initiative, based on the use of surplus commodities owned by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC - Section 416), succeed better than existing food aid programs in achieving agricultural policy reform? (Continued)

- It would permit multi-year food aid programming free from "use or lose" appropriations, and the associated pressures from commodity interest groups.
- It would increase our discretionary ability to vary annual food deliveries in accordance with the changing needs and performance of recipient countries.
- It would be an efficient, carefully targetted food aid instrument free of the "barnacles" built into PL 480 by law and agency practices, and characterized by conflicting interests and institutional perspectives.
- It would enjoy broad congressional support as a new initiative with greater promise of achieving agricultural policy reform in key Third World countries than the usual food programs under PL 480.

US Domestic Political Acceptability of the "Food for Progress" Initiative

Essential Features

Interested parties	PL 480 Continues	Food Stockpile Not Rebuilt	No Displacement of Commercial Food Exports	No Adverse Budgetary Impact	End Goal is Getting Key Third World Countries Off Dole and Back into International Commercial Food Market
Farm BLOC	+	+	+	0	+
Private Voluntary Organizations	+	-	0	0	+
Congress	+	+	+	+	0
Executive Branch	+	0	+	+	+

+ Support - Oppose 0 Neutral/Divided